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Abstract: ​Gender classifications often are controversial. These controversies               
typically focus on whether gender classifications align with facts about gender                     
kind membership: ​Could someone really be nonbinary? Is Chris Mosier (a trans man)                         
really a man? I think this is a bad approach. Consider the possibility of ontological                             
oppression, which arises when social kinds operating in a context unjustly                     
constrain the behaviors, concepts, or affect of certain groups. Gender kinds                     
operating in dominant contexts, I argue, oppress trans and nonbinary persons in                       
this way: they marginalize trans men and women, and exclude nonbinary                     
persons. As a result, facts about membership in dominant gender kinds should                       
not settle gender classification practices. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In 2016, North Carolina embroiled itself in controversy by passing the “Public Facilities 
Privacy and Security Act.” According to this law, someone could not legally enter a 
men’s restroom or locker room unless they were assigned the sex ​male​ at birth, nor could 
they legally enter a women’s restroom or locker room unless assigned the sex ​female​ at 
birth.  In short, the law insisted that anyone assigned male at birth is a man (or boy), and 1
anyone assigned female at birth is a woman (or girl), effectively refusing social and legal 
recognition of trans identities. Outcry followed the law’s passing, and heated debate 
over similar legislation -- and, indeed, trans identities in general -- continues across the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries.  Such debate often reaches 2
beyond bathroom stalls: for example, under the Trump administration, the Department 
of Health and Human Services is pushing a “biological, immutable” legal definition of 
gender, under which an individual’s gender is determined by their natal genitalia.    3
Clearly, gender classifications can be extremely controversial.  Frequently, these 4
controversies manifest as arguments over metaphysical questions, such as ​who is a man 
1 North Carolina State Assembly (2016). 
2 According to the National Center for Transgender Equality (2018), ten states introduced twenty-one 
anti-trans bills in the first eleven months of 2018. Outside the US as well, debates continue concerning 
legislation on the mutability of legal gender markers, forced sterilization of trans persons, and trans access 
to health care, among other things. 
3 Green, et al. (2018) 
4 ​There are many ways to classify gender. For example, it can occur through verbal attribution directly (e.g., 
via gender specific pronouns) or indirectly (e.g. referring to someone as ‘handsome’). It can occur through 
behavior directly (e.g., pointing someone towards the men’s bathroom) or indirectly (e.g., glaring at 
someone in the women’s bathroom). And it can occur through formal structures directly (e.g., legal gender 
markers) or through material structures indirectly (e.g., not having tampon dispensers in men’s bathrooms).  
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(or woman)? ​Or ​what makes someone a man (or woman)? ​ This manifestation seems to rely 
on the idea that gender classifications should track the gender kind membership facts. 
Call this the ‘Real Gender’ assumption. According to this assumption, someone should 
be classified as a man only if they ‘really are’ a man – that is, only if ​man​ is a recognized 
gender, and they meet its membership conditions. The same applies for all other gender 
classifications. 
The Real Gender assumption is frequently deployed by those who want to justify 
dismissals of various gender identities. For example, dismissals of nonbinary identities 
often are justified using the following logic: 
 
(1) No one is nonbinary (because there are no nonbinary genders). 
(2) Someone should be classified as nonbinary only if they really are nonbinary. 
(3) So, it is not the case that anyone should be classified as nonbinary. 
 
Premise (2) falls out of the Real Gender assumption: if gender classifications should 
track gender kind membership facts, then no one should be classified as nonbinary if no 
one is nonbinary. A similar chain of reasoning is used to justify dismissals of trans men 
and women’s identities, with premise (1) replaced by a premise about the biological 
features or social experiences that supposedly ground membership in the kinds ​men ​or 
women. ​For instance, one might think that someone ‘really is’ a woman only if they were 
raised as a girl, and that only women should be classified as women. From this, they 
conclude that trans women should not be classified as women. In each case, however, 
the reasoning vitally relies on the Real Gender assumption. 
Common objections to these arguments target the premises (such as premise (1)) that 
assume gender kinds are trans-exclusive. Opponents respond that there ​are ​nonbinary 
genders, that trans men ​really are ​men, and so on. Those who would dismiss trans 
identities, they claim, get the metaphysical facts about gender kind membership wrong.  
In this paper, I suggest that such responses target the wrong premise, and I propose 
an alternative approach. Rather than insist that gender kinds always are trans inclusive, 
I argue that we should reject the idea that gender classifications should track gender 
kind membership facts -- i.e., we should reject the Real Gender assumption.  The gender 5
kinds that operate in a given social context -- that is, the gender kinds that are socially 
salient and meaningful within that context -- may be oppressive.  Genders that ought to 6
be recognized may not be, and there may be recognized genders with unjust 
5 ​In what follows, I target an assumption that the ​metaphysics ​of gender (i.e., the real definition of ​gender ​, or 
of ​women, ​etc.) should constrain gender classification practices. Such views seem, to me, more common than 
the assumption that the ​semantics ​of gender (i.e. the correct meaning of ‘gender’, or of ‘women’, etc.) should 
constrain these practices. 
6 ​By ‘social context’, I mean communities of persons with shared clusters of beliefs, concepts, and attitudes 
that give rise to concrete social practices and structures. These clusters facilitate social interaction; they make 
it possible to “interpret and organize information and coordinate action, thought, and affect.” (Haslanger 
2016, 126) We can specify these communities with various levels of fine-grainedness, relative to the 
uniformity within shared clusters. I take ‘dominant contexts’ to be communities that not only hold more 
social power than other communities, but also impose (often unreflectively) their shared epistemic, 
conceptual, and affective systems onto less powerful communities. I here draw attention to the fact that 
social contexts differ with respect to what kinds have social meaning and status. For example, the kind 
agricultural serf ​was socially salient and meaningful in the Middle Ages, as it was embedded within 
economic, class, linguistic, and religious structures. But this kind is not particularly socially meaningful in 
the contemporary world, except perhaps as an object of historical study or exaggerated (and nerdy) insult. 
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membership conditions. Classifying gender solely based on membership in operative 
gender kinds will reinforce them; if the gender kinds are oppressive, it will reinforce that 
oppression. 
My argument proceeds in four parts. I first motivate the idea of ​ontological oppression 
and two of its manifestations: social kinds with oppressive membership conditions, and 
social contexts that unjustly fail to recognize or construct certain kinds. I then argue that 
dominant contexts gender oppression of both sorts: ​the gender kinds that operate in 
these contexts marginalize trans men and women, and these contexts exclude nonbinary 
gender kinds.​ From here, I argue we have a clear case against the Real Gender 
assumption. We see that, within dominant contexts, gender classifications should not be 
constrained by facts about gender kind membership, on pain of reinforcing ontological 
oppression. In closing, I address worries for and implications of this view.  
My argument relies on the assumption that gender kinds are social kinds. To those 
who think that genders are biological, natural, or otherwise non-social kinds, this might 
seem reason to immediately jump ship. But my argument is relevant even for those who 
hold this view. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that gender kinds are non-social 
kinds, gender classifications clearly have extremely salient and important social 
meanings. Social roles, expectations, norms, and practices, not to mention 
self-conceptions, are imposed on people based on their gender classification. Someone 
who believes that genders are non-social kinds should understand my use of ‘genders’ 
to pick out kinds of persons who are subject to certain sets of gendered self-conceptions, 
roles, expectations, norms, and practices due to their gender classification.  
 
2  Ontological Oppression 
 
What is the ontological status of social kinds? Certainly, they are real. Social kinds are 
embedded in the social world, and have immense causal impact on our lives. Even those 
based on mythical concepts, like ​witches ​in 17th century Salem, become political, 
economic, and personal realities. Moreover, when someone claims membership in a 
social kind – e.g., “​I am disabled” ​– they typically say something that is not only true, but 
also often unchosen. We frequently are forced into social kinds regardless of what we, as 
individuals, might want, say, or think. Consider how gender kinds operate in dominant 
contexts: 
 
Epistemologically speaking, women know the male world is out there 
because it hits them in the face. No matter how they think about it, try to 
think it out of existence or into a different shape, it remains independently 
real, keeps forcing them into certain molds. No matter what they think or 
do, they cannot get out of it. It has all the indeterminacy of a bridge 
abutment hit at sixty miles per hour.  7
 
In this passage, Catharine MacKinnon describes the mind-independence of a gendered 
and hierarchical world. While social kinds are ‘up to us’ in the thin sense that they 
ontologically depend on social structures and practices, we cannot revise, create, or 
destroy them through mere desire, thought, or assertion. To revise social kinds, we must 
7 MacKinnon (1989), p. 123.  
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revise material structures and practices.  Concepts are not enough; social kinds are not 8
in the head. If we want to analyze the metaphysics of a social kind, or see whether a 
certain kind operates in a social context, we must look to the relevant structures and 
practices in that context.  What people say or think​ ​about a social kind can come apart 9
from the metaphysical facts about that kind: often, we are too embedded in our spaces, 
legal systems, beliefs, and habits to clearly see the social kinds they construct.  Gender 10
kinds, for example, are discovered by looking to (e.g.) the gendered language, legal and 
family structures, labor divisions, stereotypes, merchandise, and sexual expectations and 
practices within a context -- evidence often underappreciated within popular beliefs 
about gender. 
Consider another example: the kind ​athlete. ​It is common to think that exemplar 
members of this kind -- those with marked athletic success -- are those with innate 
athletic abilities.  But this is far from the case. Closer examination of the structures and 11
practices surrounding sport reveals that the existence and membership conditions of this 
kind are, rather, sensitive not only to extensive training and nutrition practices, but also 
to complex and often sexist, classist, and ableist assumptions about what counts as 
athletic skill and what counts as sport.  As a result, the boundaries around the kind 12
athlete​ – i.e., the social rules that police membership in this kind – historically have been 
and continue to unjustly and systematically exclude certain groups (e.g., women, people 
from working class backgrounds, people with disabilities). Moreover, certain kinds 
have, as a result of the same structures and practices, failed to operate in social contexts: 
in the late 19th and early 20th century, women often were barred -- both by social stigma 
and official rules -- from athletic competitions.  Similarly, it was not until recently that 13
disability sport ​was an operative kind in dominant contexts, or that ​trans athlete ​or ​gay 
athlete ​were possible social identities, much less identities available to professionally 
successful athletes. 
This example illustrates two more general claims, which are, I hope, fairly intuitive: 
 
(1)​ Operative social kinds can have unjust membership conditions, and  
8 This view is clearly defended in Haslanger (2007) and (2015), and also is presupposed in a variety of 
sociological and historical literature, such as Molina (2014). 
9 See Haslanger (forthcoming), 14: ​"We might debate about: who is, or is not, a woman or man; whether 
some people are both women and men; whether some people are neither women nor men; whether one’s 
being a woman or man depends on context, etc. On my view...in attempting to answer them we are 
theorizing about the world. We should, I believe, draw on biological, historical, anthropological, 
sociological, psychological, and normative inquiry (including feminist theory and queer theory) to answer 
the questions. "  
10 This point has been well recognized in the feminist metaphysics literature. Haslanger (1995) uses the terms 
‘manifest’ versus ‘operative’ concepts to mark this distinction. 
11 The success of David Epstein’s 2014 book ​The Sports Gene, ​as well as the rising trend of DNA testing for 
sports capacities speaks to the prominence of this idea. 
12 See, e.g., Eckstein et al. (2012), who argue that the “athletic-industrial complex” is “an institutional conduit 
of economic and political inequality.” (501) 
13 This is not to say that there was no women’s sport, or that women did not participate in sporting events, 
but rather than their participation was often considered leisure and not competitive, as the aggressiveness 
required for competitive sport created a role-violation for many women, and one typically untolerated by 
men. Moreover, even this was hugely inflected by class: as Guttman (1991) points out, “In the 1890’s, while 
medical experts debated whether or not strenuous exercises endangered a middle-class girl’s capacity to 
conceive and bear children, working-class women were competing in six-day bicycle races.”  
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(2)​ The structures and practices within a social context can unjustly fail to 
recognize or construct certain kinds.  
 
Claim (1) points to cases where the boundaries around a social kind are set up such that 
groups who ought to have access to kind membership (or to exit membership) do not or 
rarely have such access.  The kind ​eligible voter ​provides a clear example. Historically, 14
this kind had membership conditions that unjustly excluded anyone assigned female at 
birth; today, in many US states it has conditions that unjustly exclude persons with 
criminal records.  
Claim (2) points to cases where, due to historical or continued prejudice, the social 
practices and structures in a context unjustly fail to recognize or construct a certain kind. 
I say “recognized or constructed” because this occurs both when social structures and 
practices fail to integrate already existing kinds, as well as when they unjustly fail to 
construct new kinds. An example of the first sort is doctors’ historical failure to 
recognize medical conditions that primarily affect women, such as ​endometriosis. ​The 
condition of endometriosis existed prior to social recognition. But it was unjust that this 
condition was not recognized within social practices  -- it did not have associated social 
meaning or bodies of knowledge. Examples of the second sort include lawmakers’ 
historical (and, in some contexts, continued) failure to construct the kinds ​same-sex 
marriage ​or ​minimum wage.   15
Both claims (1) and (2) point to particular manifestations of a larger phenomenon I 
call ​ontological oppression​, which occurs when the social kinds (or the lack thereof) 
unjustly constrain (or enable) persons’ behaviors, concepts, or affect due to their group 
membership.  While ontological oppression can manifest in many ways, for present 16
purposes, I am interested in these two ways: namely, where membership conditions or 
ontological lacunas create these unjust constraints (or enablements).   17
The two manifestations often are sides of the same coin. Consider heterosexist 
membership conditions for ​marriage​: i.e., restrictions that only allow marriage between 
someone legally recognized as male and someone legally recognized as female. A 
context with these conditions could also be described as unjustly failing to construct the 
kinds ​same-sex marriage ​or ​polyamorous marriage​. In fact, the explanation for why ​marriage 
has unjust membership conditions is the same as the explanation for why these other 
kinds unjustly are not constructed.  Both explanations come back to the social structures 18
and practices within that context -- ones that fail to legally recognize queer and 
polyamorous relationships. The difference here is one of emphasis: namely, whether the 
14 Another way to describe this is as grounds ​ ​for kind membership that unjustly constrain access to the 
social standing and recognition that accompanies membership. This is distinct -- though importantly 
connected -- to the question of whether injustice causally entered into the process by which a kind or its 
membership conditions were constructed. 
15 In the U.S., these failures perpetuated until 2015 and 1938, respectively. 
16 Within this, I include access to social goods such as healthcare (as in the case of endometriosis). Dembroff 
(2017) explores the idea of ontological oppression more thoroughly – here, I focus only on a portion of the 
idea relevant for present purposes. See also Jenkins (2016) for exploration of a similar idea. 
17 Another way ontological oppression manifests is when the ​social meaning ​of kind membership is unjust. 
Frequently, this leads to wrongful treatment of kind members -- racism, ableism, transphobia, and other 
prejudices are indicative of this type of ontological oppression.. 
18 This is not to suggest that marriage would be a just institution with these adaptations -- see Chambers 
(2017). 
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relevant injustice is best described as the failure to allow queer and polyamorous 
persons into an existing social kind, or as the failure to construct new social kinds that 
explicitly recognize these relationships.  
Because kinds like ​marriage ​and ​eligible voter ​have (at least largely) legally codified 
membership conditions, these are easy places to identify ontological oppression. The 
history (including contemporary history) of these kinds is fraught with membership 
conditions designed to reinforce the same sexist, racist, ableist, and xenophobic contexts 
that first constructed them. That is, in short, oppressive social contexts generate social 
kinds that reinforce those contexts. A patriarchal context that bars women from the kind 
eligible voter ​thereby constructs ​eligible voter​ in a way that perpetuates patriarchal control. 
A heterosexist state that fails to recognize queer and polyamorous relationships 
constructs ​marriage, civil union, legal guardian ​and other related kinds in ways that 
perpetuate its heterosexist structures. And so on.  
We see the same pattern in oppressive contexts where certain identities are 
unrecognized or unavailable. Consider the long struggle against what has come to be 
known as “bisexual erasure”, or the systematic misrecognition of bisexual​ ​identity. This 
misrecognition is a global phenomenon, and has been well documented across both 
legal and non-legal contexts.  Due to pervasive protection of heteronormativity, and the 19
corresponding policing of masculinity and erasure of female sexuality, bisexual men 
frequently are classified as gay, and bisexual women as straight, despite their protests to 
the contrary. This is an example of ontological oppression, not because ​gay ​and ​straight​ -- 
i.e., the operative sexual orientation kinds -- have unjust membership conditions, but 
because social structures and practices fail to recognize the kind ​bisexual.  
These examples illustrate the two aforementioned types of ontological oppression. 
Further examples could draw from many other social kinds, such as ​philosopher, parent, 
or ​disabled, ​not to mention various racial, class, caste, economic, religious, and scientific 
kinds​.  ​Unjust social structures and practices abound. So too, then, do examples of 20
social kinds (or the lack thereof) that have unjustly constrained (or enabled) groups of 
people. 
At this point, we are positioned to criticize a generic version of the Real Gender 
assumption: 
 
Social kind classifications ought to track the operative social kind 
membership facts. 
 
This generic version tells us that social classifications should be conditioned on 
whether the target kind operates in one’s social context, and its membership conditions 
are met. Here, the assumption purports to be innocently truth-tracking: it appears to 
merely ensure that a community’s classifications faithfully tracks the social kinds that 
operate in their community.  
19 See, e.g., Marcus (2018) and ​Yoshino (2000), among many others. 
20 For example, in the 1950’s and 60’s in the United States, gays and lesbians were not recognized as parents, 
even of their own biological offspring. See Rivers (2015), 31: “Being a lesbian or a gay man was widely 
understood [in the 1950’s and 60’s US] as antithetical to parenting; the threat of losing custody of their 
children kept many men and women from leaving heterosexual marriages and enforced the silence and 
invisibility of those who did raise children in same-sex households.” 
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This might seem tempting. In general, we want classification practices to be 
truth-tracking. It is disastrous when chefs treat plants as edible that are poisonous, or 
when licensing boards treat persons as doctors who lack the relevant competencies. 
Similarly, constraining classifications to accurately track social kind memberships is 
fundamental to social coordination.  It is not unreasonable to want our concepts, 21
linguistic and legal markers, and material spaces to faithfully track these memberships. 
Moreover, this assumption provides what might seem to be reasonable constraints on 
when an individual can demand that their self-identification, or what they take 
themselves to be, become a social identification, or what others recognize them as being.
 It says that, if someone’s self-identification is unintelligible in a social context, it need 22
not be recognized. The same applies for self-identifications that, while perhaps 
intelligible, conflict with an operative kind’s membership conditions. For these reasons, 
we can ignore someone who claims to be a Viking, or someone who is very wealthy but 
claims to be middle-class.  
Despite this apparent innocence, the generic assumption ignores the possibility of 
ontological oppression.  Assuming that social kinds can have unjust membership 23
conditions, or that the structures and practices in a context can unjustly fail to recognize 
or construct certain kinds, constraining classifications to track operative social kinds 
would be ill advised. It would perpetuate unjust kinds, or the unjust exclusion of certain 
kinds, rather than adapt social practices to newly construct, revise, or eliminate 
operative social kinds. In short, the assumption is a mechanism for maintaining the 
ontological status quo​. ​It fails to account for what Ian Hacking, Ron Mallon and others 
call the “looping effect” between classification practices and social kinds.  This looping 24
effect, in brief, is the mutual causal feedback between classification practices and what 
social kinds exist: by developing classification practices, we create social kinds, which in 
turn impact classification practices, and on so. The looping effect, as Mallon describes it, 
means that “human [kinds]​ ​themselves are...in some way a product of a community’s 
practices of labeling and differentially treating [kind] members.”  Mallon’s insight 25
concisely reveals why classification practices should stray from the operative social 
kinds under conditions of ontological oppression. Unless they do so, they will reinforce 
that oppression.  
 
 
3 Ontological Gender Oppression 
 
  
In this section, I take the notion of ontological oppression and apply it to gender kinds. I 
argue that the Real Gender assumption guides many disputes over gender classification, 
21 See O’Connor (forthcoming). 
22 That is, constraints on uptake of ‘agential identity’. See Dembroff and Saint-Croix (manuscript). 
23 As Joanna Lawson pointed out to me, the generic assumption is untenable for a broader reason: it 
forecloses the possibility that we should, for ​any ​reason, create new social kinds or revise existing social 
kinds. Here I focus on moral reasons for changing or revising social kinds, but we can imagine cases where 
other sort of reasons, e.g., pragmatic or epistemic reasons, are more relevant.  
24 See Mallon (2016) and Hacking (1999). Hacking is primarily focused on scientific classifications, but the 
framework can be applied more broadly. 
25 Mallon (2016), p. 1. Mallon uses ‘categories’ but I use ‘kinds’ in order to avoid connotations of mere 
linguistic construction. 
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and also that we have reason to think that the operative gender kinds within dominant 
contexts are oppressive. As a result, we have good reason to reject the Real Gender 
assumption. Even the most accurate analysis of these gender kinds will not settle what 
gender classification practices should be. In closing, I’ll gesture toward ameliorative 
approaches to ontological gender oppression, in lieu of the Real Gender assumption. 
 
3.1 The Real Gender assumption  
 
Let’s spell out the Real Gender assumption: 
 
Gender classifications should track the operative gender kind 
membership facts. 
  
The prominence of this assumption is difficult to overstate. Consider the rhetoric 
surrounding disputes over gender recognition with respect to public spaces, such as the 
North Carolina ‘Public Facilities Privacy and Security Act’ or the U.K.’s ‘Gender 
Recognition Act’. In these contexts, social conservatives who reject trans identities 
typically base their position on a genital-based understanding of gender kinds, which 
says that one’s gender is based on one’s natal genitalia.  They then deploy the Real 26
Gender assumption: gender classifications therefore should track (genital-based) gender 
kind membership. We can see this move in rhetoric employed by opponents of a city 
ordinance in Charlotte, North Carolina, that (among other things) forbid discrimination 
on the basis of gender identity: 
 
“A few, short years ago, you...would have laughed at the idea of a man 
showering in a locker room with your daughter.”  27
 
“Keeping separate facilities validates the uniqueness of each gender. Male 
and female were created distinctly to fulfill vital roles in our society. [We 
must] protect the safety and sanctity of our men, women...boys, and 
girls.”  28
 
“White woman identifies as Black… Man identifies as woman...We’re 
going to throw out science and DNA?”  29
 
While tortured, these statements circle around a similar logic:  
 
(a) One’s natal genitalia determines one’s gender. 
(b) Gender classifications should map the gender kind membership 
facts. 
26 Sometimes the position is based on a ‘socialization’ view of gender, on which one’s childhood 
socialization determines one’s gender. Since this socialization is based upon natal genitalia, though, the 
extensions of the two views are nearly identical. 
27 “ ​Charlotte City Council approves LGBT protections in 7-4 vote” (2016) 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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(c) Therefore,​ ​trans persons should be classified according to their 
natal genitalia. 
 
In this line of reasoning, (b) assumes a particular connection between the gender kind 
membership facts and what gender classification practices should be. But, as mentioned 
previously, rather than question this assumption, progressives by and large focus on 
challenging (a). That is, their efforts take (b) for granted, and target the claim that gender 
kind membership (even in dominant contexts) is determined by natal genitalia. This 
focus is apparent in recent literature on the metaphysics of gender, where philosophers 
employ the following sort of argumentative schema: 
 
1. Persons in Group X are men. 
2. Theory T implies that persons in Group X aren't men. 
3.  Therefore, we should reject Theory T. 
 
For example, one version of this schema would go as follows: 
 
i.  Trans men are men. 
ii. Position-based theories of gender imply that some trans men  
aren’t men.  30
iii. Therefore, we should reject position-based theories of gender.   31
 
The schema, on the surface, seems to provide a powerful tool against particular theories 
of gender. Counter-examples are, after all, a regular feature of argumentation. But claims 
taking the form of (1) often appear insensitive to the highly contextual nature of 
operative gender kinds. Once we build in that sensitivity, it suggests that these 
arguments draw upon intuitions that build a schema more like the following: 
 
1*. Persons in Group X should be classified as men in dominant 
contexts. 
2. Theory T implies that persons in Group X aren't men within dominant 
contexts. 
3.  Therefore, we should reject Theory T. 
 
This schema prescribes a certain gender classification practice, and then evaluates a 
theory of gender kinds based on whether gender kind membership according to that 
theory align with the prescribed classification practice. But this move again seems to rely 
on the assumption that gender kind membership should constrain gender classification 
-- i.e., the Real Gender assumption. On this way of thinking, an accurate theory of 
gender will reveal​ ​answers to questions such as, ‘Should we use male-coded language 
(e.g., ‘son’, ‘sir’) to refer to a trans man?’ Or ‘Should the federal government recognize 
nonbinary genders?’ For this reason, a theory that describes trans-exclusive gender 
kinds often is rejected not only for implying that trans identity claims are false, but also 
30 Namely, trans men who are not perceived as men. 
31 For an example of this argumentative move, see McKitrick (2015). 
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that gender classifications need not be trans-inclusive.  (I argue in Section 3.3 that a 32
theory of gender need not do either.) 
Here, I agree with Elizabeth Barnes, who notes that on most accounts of gender, 
facts about gender kind membership are taken to underlie facts about which gender 
classifications are unjust: 
 
A successful account of gender ought to say that trans women are 
women; it would be ​unjust ​not to classify trans women as women. But 
at least part of that injustice, on most accounts,​ ​consists in failing to 
treat trans women as what they are. That is, it’s unjust to say that trans 
women aren’t women because trans women ​really are ​women.  33
 
Barnes here observes that, on most accounts, the fact that gender classifications should 
be trans-inclusive is taken to be explained​ ​by facts about gender kind membership.  But 34
notice that this entails the Real Gender assumption. To take facts about kind 
membership to explain facts about just and unjust classification just is to take the former 
facts to constrain the latter facts, such that only those who are, say, men have claim to 
classification as men. 
Sometimes this assumption is implicit. Jennifer McKitrick (2015), for example, 
rejects position-based theories on gender on the ground that they have “problematic 
implications for transgender.”  But sometimes it is more explicit. Mari Mikkola (2016) 35
argues that theories of gender ought to be constrained by the gender classifications that 
trans persons want: 
 
Theory of gender that point-blank excludes trans* women from women’s 
social kind is simply unacceptable. But just as I find it politically 
problematic to propose such an exclusionary theory, I find it problematic 
to propose a view that unquestionably includes trans* women. After all, 
not all trans* women want to be part of women’s social kind... Some want 
to be identified specifically as trans* women rather than women… 
Political concerns are critical when deciding how to proceed.  36
 
Mikkola suggests that we prefer theories​ ​of gender that align with certain political 
commitments regarding gender classification.  Trans identities deserve to be respected 37
in our classifications, so theories of gender should be sensitive to these identities and 
avoid implying that trans identities do not track the relevant gender kinds. But here 
again, we find the Real Gender assumption. Without this assumption, it is unclear why 
32 For sake of clarity, I somewhat begrudgingly use the term ‘trans-inclusive’, even though trans persons are 
not merely included within operative gender kinds in trans-friendly contexts, but are paradigmatic 
members of these kinds. 
33 Barnes (2016) ​. 
34 ​There are important exceptions, most notably the work of Talia Bettcher (2009, 2013, 2014), Ásta (2011), 
and Jenkins (2016). 
35 McKitrick (2015). 
36 Mikkola (2016), 114-115. 
37 ​In fact, this constraint on a metaphysical analysis of gender has become so widespread that it is known as 
the “commonality constraint,” and is also found in Bach (2012), Tiechman (manuscript), and McKitrick 
(2015). 
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we should ensure that theories of gender align with what we take to be just gender 
classification practices.  
Ontological oppression exposes the flaw with the Real Gender assumption: it 
presupposes that the gender kinds operating in one’s context are not deeply distorted 
and unjust. This presupposition is not justified. 
Why, then, do we frequently appeal to this assumption? The primary reason, I 
think, is a tendency to ignore the contextual nature and plurality of gender kinds while 
remaining committed to the idea that trans and queer identities track real gender kinds. 
But we cannot have it both ways: commitment to gender constructionism pushes us to 
give up the mirage that one set of gender kinds operates in all contexts. On a 
constructionist picture, material structures and social practices construct gender kinds: 
structures and practices that vary across contexts. In short, it implies pluralism about 
operative gender kinds.  And while I cannot fully defend gender pluralism here, it’s 38
noteworthy that context-sensitive gender theorizing is standard practice within other 
humanities and the social sciences. There is overwhelming evidence that gender 
structures and practices vary across place and time, and are constructed in tandem with 
race, religion, class, ability, and other social identities. This gives us excellent reason to 
think that operative gender kinds differ in drastic and important ways across contexts: 
the gender kinds that operate in dominant Western contexts may differ from those that 
operate in indigenous contexts, trans and queer contexts, historical contexts, etc. 
When we take this pluralism seriously, we see the possibility that operative gender 
kind in dominant contexts (herafter ‘dominant gender kinds’) differ from those within 
communities of color, or within queer, working class, or disabled communities, as well 
as their many intersections. My focus in what follows is on a particular way these kinds 
differ. Specifically, I argue that dominant gender kinds marginalize trans men and 
women, and do not include non-binary kinds. Given this, I’ll argue that those who take 
trans inclusion within dominant contexts to be a worthy political goal have good reason 
to reject the Real Gender assumption.  Instead, I’ll suggest that they should work to 39
import the gender kinds that operate in trans and queer communities.  
 
3.2 Dominant Gender Kinds 
 
We’ve seen the Real Gender assumption appear in popular and philosophical discourse 
surrounding gender classifications. We’ve also seen that the possibility of ontological 
oppression undermines this assumption. That is, seeing that social kinds can be 
oppressive undermines the idea that we should rely on them to determine classification 
38 Pluralism is not deflationism about gender kinds. Nor do pluralists, like Elizabeth Spelman and others, 
take intersectional considerations to reveal futility in metaphysical theorizing about gender. Gender 
pluralism, as I am thinking about it, is, the view that there are many gender kinds, only some of which 
operate in a given context.. 
39 I hedge here because I don’t assume that trans inclusion within dominant contexts is a valuable political 
goal. Much depends, to my mind, on how successfully queer and trans practices can be truly adopted, 
rather than modified so as to assimilate queer and trans persons into dominant culture. For queer critiques 
of such assimilation, see Stone (1992), Bornstein (1994), and Spade (2015), among others. See Section 3.3 for 
further discussion. 
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practices. Here, I argue that dominant gender kinds are oppressive, focusing on trans 
and nonbinary persons in particular.   40
I won’t provide a complete defense for this claim: many books and articles have 
outlined in detail the material spaces, conceptual lacunas, legal and economic practices, 
derogatory language, medical barriers, and other social systems that regularly 
marginalize or erase trans and nonbinary identities. My goal is simply to point to 
evidence that dominant gender kinds marginalize trans women and men and exclude 
nonbinary kinds. If true, dominant gender kinds arise from and reinforce oppressive 
social systems – i.e., they reveal ontological oppression of both previously discussed 
varieties. But in that case, those in dominant contexts should not base gender 
classifications on these kinds. 
Let’s first consider the claim that dominant gender kinds have unjust membership 
conditions – in particular, ones that marginalize trans women and men. To see why this 
is true, one need only look to the structures and practices that rely on natal genitalia, or 
secondary sex characteristics and aesthetics taken to indicate natal genitalia, to 
determine persons’ genders. As MacKinnon succinctly puts this point, “Male dominant 
society has defined women as a discrete biological group forever.”  While trans 41
identities have garnered some social and legal recognition in progressive circles, it 
remains the case that default​ ​gender designations (via assigned sex at birth) are based on 
natal genitalia, and also that trans persons are far from achieving acceptance that is not 
conditional on their assimilating to cisnormative bodily presentations. 
Within the United States, for example, some states do not allow trans persons to 
change their legal gender markers. Many more have draconian rules for doing so, 
including required surgeries or other medical treatments that, even if desired, are often 
economically inaccessible to trans persons, who are more likely to be unemployed and 
uninsured.  Moreover, both inside and outside legal structures -- and particularly in the 42
criminal justice system and prison industrial complex -- there is constant and systematic 
discrimination against trans people, and especially those who are visibly trans.  These 43
facts get increasingly worse when we consider intersectional identities: trans women, 
and especially trans women of color, are most likely to experience fatal violence, 
unemployment, domestic abuse, harassment, and a lack of access to medical care.  44
Looking directly at dominant gender kinds, we can see that, to quote Talia Bettcher, “a 
trans [woman] would be—at most—legitimized as a (marginal) woman through 
somehow arguing that she meets enough of the dominant criteria of membership.”  45
Within these contexts, Bettcher points out, trans identity claims are either unjustified or 
justified only to the extent that these identities are intelligible according to “dominant 
40 I agree with Bettcher (2013), 243, that part of what explains this ontological oppression are false beliefs – 
specifically, in my view, false beliefs about determined or ‘natural’ connections between biological features, 
psychological features, and social roles. 
41 Williams (2015), interviewing MacKinnon. 
42 National Center for Transgender Equality (2016).  
43 National Center for Transgender Equality (2016). Almost one-third of trans people live in poverty and are 
twice as likely to be unemployed, one-fourth have avoided medical care from fear or harassment, and half 
experience intimate partner violence. See also Stanley and Smith (2011) and Knight & Wilson (2016) for 
trans-centered critiques of the criminal justice system and the prison industrial complex. 
44 National Center for Transgender Equality (2016).  
45 Bettcher (2013), 246. The original quote read “trans person”. 
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criteria of membership.”  The bar for justification is raised when trans identities 46
intersect with other marginalized identities.  47
A distinct but related form of oppression concerns those who claim nonbinary 
identities – that is, those who do not identify exclusively as men or women. Within 
dominant contexts, there is even less recognition of nonbinary identities than trans 
binary identities.  In the United States as of 2018, every state requires binary gender 48
markers to be assigned at birth, and only four states and Washington D.C. allow persons 
to later select a nonbinary gender marker. Those who are able to get nonbinary gender 
markers struggle to obtain passports and other legal documentation.  As with trans men 49
and women, this lack of recognition extends into medical, workplace, educational, and 
other social domains. Within these domains, nonbinary identities often are not only 
ignored, but unintelligible. Once again, this system of misrecognition is generated by the 
structures and practices that construct and define dominant gender kinds. These facts 
suggest that, within most dominant contexts, nonbinary gender kinds simply do not 
appear.​ ​While nonbinary identities are recognized within trans-inclusive communities, 
these identities have no home within dominant contexts, where everyone is forced into 
one of two binary kinds (​men ​and ​women​).  
There are many injustices that arise from this exclusion. One in particular is nicely 
captured by Naomi Scheman’s work on heteronormativity, and the limitations it places 
on the ‘narratives’ or social scripts that we use for making ourselves intelligible to 
ourselves and to others. “Narrativity per se may be humanly important,” Scheman 
writes, “but we have no access to narrativity per se: What we have are culturally specific 
narratives, which facilitate the smooth telling of some lives and straitjacket, distort, or 
fracture others.”  Intelligibility often is inaccessible to queer and trans subjects within 50
dominant contexts, where their identities have no location within the operative gender 
kinds. And while this certainly applies to both nonbinary and trans binary subjects, the 
complete failure to recognize nonbinary gender kinds within dominant contexts makes 
the intelligibility problem especially salient for nonbinary persons. 
Again, I haven’t presented a comprehensive picture of how dominant gender kinds 
marginalize and erase trans and nonbinary identities. Any such argument would span 
multiple books and draw from philosophical, historical, legal, sociological, 
anthropological, political, and other sources of information.  Happily, other scholars 51
collectively already have done this detailed work. My goal is simply to draw attention to 
the fact that, within dominant contexts, “we [trans people] are systematically 
constructed in ways that run contrary to our own self-identifications.”  As a result, 52
dominant gender kinds systematically oppress persons who claim trans and nonbinary 
46 Bettcher (2013), 246. 
47 See, e.g., Koyama (2006) which examines how trans women of color, and in particular those from working 
class backgrounds, are systematically excluded from white feminist spaces. See also Roen (2001), which 
discusses how some trans persons of color resist contemporary western trans medical practices in order to 
retain cultural values, making it difficult for them to achieve uptake of their identities, including within 
queer theorizing.  
48 By ‘trans binary identities’, I mean trans male and trans female identities. 
49 The international legal landscape also is complex. As of 2018, Canada, India, and Australia have voluntary 
third gender markers, and a few other countries mandate third gender markers for persons with intersex 
conditions, or at least allow such persons to claim a third gender marker. 
50 Scheman (2011) 113-114 
51 See, e.g., Bornstein (1994), Risman (2018), Clark (forthcoming), Stryker (2008), among many more. 
52 Bettcher (2007), 69. 
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identities. They do not reveal what gender classification practices should be; they reveal 
what these practices have been. 
 
3.3 Beyond the ‘Real Gender’ Assumption 
 
I’ve argued that we should not employ the Real Gender assumption, on pain of 
reinforcing oppressive gender kinds. My argument, as it applies to dominant contexts in 
particular, can be summarized as follows:  53
 
1. The Real Gender assumption should not guide gender classifications in contexts 
where the operative gender kinds are oppressive. 
 
2. Dominant gender kinds oppress trans and nonbinary persons. 
 
3. So, the Real Gender assumption should not guide gender classifications in 
dominant contexts. 
 
In dominant contexts, it is wrongheaded to determine gender classifications by looking 
to operative gender kinds. But how, then, should they be decided? What ​should​ guide 
gender classifications? 
On a bootstrapping approach, classification practices might be based on what, 
according our best normative theory, seems to accommodate the interests of gender 
justice. This approach would begin with a series of difficult questions such as ‘How 
much autonomy should someone have over their gender kind membership?’ ‘Which 
gender kinds should we recognize?’ Or ‘How can we balance an interest in gender 
autonomy with an interest in social coordination?’​ ​Classification practices could then be 
devised based upon answers to these questions. 
This approach, perhaps appealing to theorists, poses serious practical worries. 
Making it workable requires coordination and agreement on a range of complex 
normative issues, as well as in devising and implementing new classification practices. 
While not impossible, there is a more feasible approach. On this different approach -- the 
‘imitation’ approach -- classification practices can be revised based upon those that 
already exist within other communities. Given that operative gender kinds vary across 
contexts, looking at other communities will reveal alternative gender kinds and 
corresponding classification practices. From here, those in one context can attempt to 
revise their operative gender kinds by mirroring or otherwise imitating the structures 
and practices that already exist in other contexts.   54
To improve dominant gender kinds, trans inclusive and queer communities are 
obvious places to begin. The operative gender kinds in these contexts are markedly 
different than those in dominant contexts. For one, within these communities, nonbinary 
gender identities have intelligible social meaning because of systems that accommodate 
these identities. For example, these communities have developed systems of gender 
neutral language, gender neutral physical spaces, practices of attention to chosen names 
53 I take my claim to undercut the Real Gender assumption in all contexts, but here focus on dominant ones. 
54 For example, consider the Swedish decisions to import (with some alteration) the Finnish gender neutral 
pronoun ‘h ​än ​’, rather than invent a neologism.  
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and pronouns, and increased freedom within gender expression and gender roles.  55
Collectively, these structures and practices create intelligible social space for those who 
claim nonbinary identities: that is, they construct nonbinary gender kinds.   56
Similarly, within these communities, membership criteria for ​men ​and ​women ​differ 
from the corresponding criteria in dominant contexts. Genitalia--much less natal 
genitalia--does not determine gender classification. Individuals are granted authority 
over their gender kind membership. They also are given -- to some extent -- authority 
over the social significance of this membership: 
 
In [trans-inclusive communities], the authority of transsubjects in 
determining self-identity is generally taken as a starting point, and the 
significance of the gender presentation as well as gender identification 
category is generally provided by the subjects own personal ‘intelligibility 
conferring’ narrative.  57
 
In trans-inclusive contexts, in other words, individual autonomy over both gender kind 
membership and the meaning of that membership is presupposed. Gender classification 
practices in such communities defer to self-identification, and do not take anatomical 
information or gender presentation to determine gender. Not only is someone’s claim to 
be (e.g.) a woman taken as authoritative, so too are her claims about what this identity 
signifies about herself and how she would like others to interpret this claim.  
Again, I’ve given nowhere near an exhaustive analysis of trans and queer gender 
kinds. They are legion, and can be treated with evermore fine-grained contextual and 
intersectional analysis. But I hope to have said enough to motivate the idea that those in 
dominant contexts are not constrained to either rely on the Real Gender assumption or 
attempt to build new gender kinds from the ground up. Trans-inclusive gender kinds 
have rich histories within trans and queer communities: why reinvent the wheel when it 
is spinning and fabulous? 
With that said, the idea of bringing trans-inclusive gender kinds into dominant 
contexts raises serious challenges. One obvious challenge is whether trans and 
nonbinary gender kinds could be incorporated within dominant structures (such as legal 
systems and educational, corporate, and religious institutions) without being destroyed. 
Are these kinds doomed to become distorted when integrate into dominant contexts? 
Queer theorists have been almost uniformly skeptical that this distortion could be 
avoided: 
 
What is gained is acceptability in society. What is lost in the ability to 
authentically represent the complexities and ambiguities of lived 
experience…. To attempt to occupy a place...within the traditional gender 
frame is to become complicit in the discourse that one wishes to 
deconstruct.  58
 
55 For empirical research and first-personal accounts of these structures and practices, see e.g., Risman 
(2018), Bradford et al. (2018), and Nestle, et al. (2012). 
56 Dembroff (manuscript). 
57 Bettcher (2007), 59. 
58 Stone (1992), 164-165. 
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Sandy Stone here articulates the worry that dominant gender systems are simply 
incapable of recognizing trans and nonbinary identities. These systems inevitably reduce 
such identities. In particular, they destroy the “complexities and ambiguities” that are 
central to trans and nonbinary identities, and impose conformity onto them -- a 
conformity that is necessary for state, economic, and social control over gender. Such 
control is, according to Stone (and I agree), characteristic of dominant contexts. 
I sympathize with these worries. But for two reasons, I do not take them to 
undermine all attempts to make dominant gender kinds more trans and nonbinary 
inclusive. Nor do they undermine arguments against the Real Gender assumption.  
First, I think these concerns are tempered by the deconstructive potential of trans 
and queer identities once brought into dominant contexts. Could dominant gender 
systems continue to function as they currently do once they incorporate trans and 
nonbinary gender kinds? I agree with Stone that these systems, as they currently stand, 
are incompatible with such identities. But why assume the latter, rather than the former, 
will be broken down? Trans-hostile people recognize this alternative possibility: If 
gender becomes based on self-identification, they worry, the social systems that 
smoothly determine social expectations, family structures, sexual availability, and 
gender-based labor divisions will become muddied and inefficient.  Here, to my mind, 59
one man’s modus tollens is one queer’s modus ponens.  
Second, I agree with many queer theorists that oppressive, trans-hostile and 
heterosexist social structures produce (and have produced) vibrant communities 
committed to alternative gender possibilities.  These communities are extremely 60
valuable. But does that mean we should preserve trans-hostile and heterosexist social 
structures? Revising dominant gender kinds isn’t an ‘all or none’ situation: any degree of 
assimilation may be to some extent destructive of trans and nonbinary gender kinds. But 
also destructive are the effects of trans and nonbinary misrecognition, including police 
violence, marginalization, incarceration, unemployment, homelessness, domestic abuse, 
and suicide. In the end, we may find that there is no true middle ground between 
destructive oppression and destructive assimilation. But I think working to find one is 
preferable to the status quo, particularly given the number of trans and nonbinary 
persons who sincerely desire gender classifications, within dominant contexts, that align 
with their self-identities.  61
 
4 Worries & Upshots 
 
Using dominant contexts as my central case, I’ve argued for scrapping the Real Gender 
assumption. I’ve also suggested an ‘imitation’ strategy for revising dominant gender 
kinds. I now turn to worries for and upshots of this view. 
 
4.1 Are Trans and Nonbinary Gender Identities Nonveridical? 
 
One might worry that, if I am right that dominant gender kinds marginalize and exclude 
trans and nonbinary persons, then trans and nonbinary identities are nonveridical. That 
59 Thanks to Katharine Jenkins for raising this point. 
60 See Foucault (1978) on power and productivity. 
61 I assume a prima facie obligation to respect individuals’ request for social recognition of their 
self-identities. See McQueen (2016) for a critique of “post-identity” queer politics. 
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is, because trans and nonbinary gender kinds do not operate in dominant contexts, one 
might worry that trans and nonbinary identities do not reflect actual gender kind 
memberships. Moreover, one might think, feminist theorizing should provide theories of 
gender such that trans identities always are veridical. 
I think this criticism comes from a mindset according to which metaphysicians are 
restricted to the following options: 
 
1) Privilege Dominant Contexts:​ Dominant gender kinds are the only gender 
kinds. Gender identities are veridical when they track these kinds. 
 
or 
 
2) Privilege Trans Contexts:​ Trans-inclusive gender kinds are the only gender 
kinds. Gender identities are veridical when they track these kinds. 
 
This is a false dichotomy. Again, because gender kinds are socially constructed, we 
should expect operative gender kinds vary across contexts. While trans and nonbinary 
identities may not align with dominant gender kinds, this does not mean that they are 
nonveridical. At most, it would mean that they are nonveridical in dominant contexts 
and veridical in trans-inclusive contexts. 
I say ‘at most’ because we need not even accept this. Trans and nonbinary identities 
could both fail to align with dominant gender kinds and​ ​remain veridical even within 
dominant contexts. This is because one’s gender kind memberships are indexed to 
various gender kinds, only some of which operate in one’s immediate context. 
Someone’s identity, then, may be based on membership in a kind that is not operative in 
their immediate context.  
To illustrate, consider the following passage, which addresses a similar scenario with 
respect to race: 
 
Some men who are black in New Orleans now would have been 
octoroons there some years ago or would be white in Brazil today. 
Socrates had no race in ancient Athens, though he would be a white man 
in Minnesota.  62
 
At first pass, this text suggests that some persons who are black in New Orleans today, if 
transported to Brazil, would no longer be black. They would speak falsely​ ​if they said, in 
Brazil, “I am black.” After all, one might think, if we are going to accept that race is 
socially constructed, then operative racial kinds vary across contexts. But if operative 
kinds vary across contexts, then one’s race also seems to vary across contexts. Similarly, 
one might think, for gender. Accepting--as I’ve argued--that operative gender kinds vary 
across contexts, then some persons who are men in trans-inclusive contexts are not men 
in dominant contexts. On this reading, a trans man’s identity becomes nonveridical in 
dominant contexts. He speaks falsely if he says in this context, “I am a man.”  
Despite the intuitive pull of this idea, it is one we have good reason to deny. 
Pluralism about operative gender kinds is compatible with the claim that a trans man‘s 
62 Root (2000, S631-632), cited in Mallon (2004). 
17 
 
Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender 
 
 
identity is veridical in all contexts. And this means it is compatible with the idea that 
when he says, “I am a man”, he picks out a true proposition regardless of the context of 
utterance. 
To see why, we can follow Joshua Glasgow in distinguishing between ‘modest’ and 
‘extreme’ ontological pluralism.  On ​modest ​ontological pluralism about gender, 63
someone simultaneously has multiple genders, relative to different gender kinds.64
However, the salience and relevance of a given gender differs across contexts, because 
contexts differ in their operative gender kinds. For example, relative to dominant 
contexts, someone’s classification based on natal genitalia may be most salient and 
relevant, even though they simultaneously belong to distinct gender kinds that operate 
in trans-inclusive contexts. On ​extreme ​ontological pluralism about gender, in contrast, 
someone only has one gender kind membership at a given time, and this membership 
depends on the operative gender kinds in one’s immediate context. That is, for example, 
as one moves from a dominant to a trans-inclusive context, their gender might change 
from ​woman ​(relative to the dominant kind) to ​man ​(relative to the trans inclusive kind).  
This distinction reveals two additional options for metaphysicians: 
 
3) Adopt extreme ontological pluralism:​ One’s gender kind membership changes 
across contexts. 
 
or 
 
4) Adopt modest ontological pluralism:​ One is a member of many gender kinds, 
but the social relevance of these memberships change across contexts.  65
 
Pluralism rules out a single set of operative gender kinds. But it leaves open a further 
question: do our gender kind memberships change across contexts (extreme pluralism), 
or do they travel with us across contexts (modest pluralism)? 
Glasgow argues that constructionism only gives us reason to accept modest 
ontological pluralism. That is, social constructionism about gender does not give us 
reason to think that someone’s gender changes​ ​across contexts. Gender kinds are socially 
constructed; this doesn’t mean one must be at the site of a kind’s construction in order to 
belong to that kind. Gender constructionism simply gives us reason to think that there 
isn’t a “location independent standard” by which one’s gender is determined.  One can 66
63 Glasgow (2007), 560-561. Glasgow uses the language of ‘ontological localism’, rather than ‘ontological 
pluralism’, and ‘concepts’ rather than ‘kinds’. However, Glasgow’s ontological localism is a version of 
pluralism, and the term ‘concepts’ is used to pick out social kinds. 
64 Of course, someone may have no place at all within a given set of operative gender kinds, as I’ve argued is 
sometimes the case for nonbinary persons within dominant contexts. 
65 Does this view amount to gender kinds like ​woman ​or ​man ​being like ​rich ​ or ​tall ​, where they are single 
kinds with context variant standards? While I cannot defend this claim fully here, it is important to 
recognize that the number, membership conditions, and social significance of particular gender kinds varies 
across contexts. Given this, it is hard to see how there could be a single set of operative gender kinds, 
differing only in contextual standards. Thanks to Mike Rea for raising this worry. 
66 Glasgow (2007), 561. Epstein (2014) makes a very similar point, arguing that we must distinguish contexts 
of construction and contexts of instantiation. Once we’ve done so, we can “look for baristas in the Ottoman 
Empire or in 17th century England,” even though this kind arguably was constructed in the 20th century. 
Glasgow and Epstein (rightly, I think) depart from the view of social ontology sometimes suggested in 
Foucault -- i.e., that social properties and kinds can be instantiated only within their context of construction.  
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have multiple genders, all of which are indexed to various gender kinds, many of which 
may not operate in one’s immediate context.  
This modest ontological pluralism about gender is enough to secure veridicality 
(even if not social intelligibility) for trans and nonbinary identities within dominant 
contexts. Suppose that someone is a woman relative to dominant gender kinds, but a 
man relative to trans-inclusive gender kinds. According to modest ontological pluralism, 
this person has both of these gender kind memberships in all contexts. For this reason he 
can truthfully say, “I am a man.”  This is because the term ‘man’ in his claim refers to 67
the trans-inclusive gender kind -- a kind he retains membership in even when in 
contexts where this kind is not operative.  68
At the point, one might worry that there is a lurking tension between my claim that 
dominant contexts have oppressive operative gender kinds, and my claim that trans 
persons’ gender-identities are veridical even in dominant contexts.  Where is the 69
oppression, one might wonder, if not in undermining trans identities? It is tempting to 
think that, if trans identities are veridical in dominant contexts, these contexts aren’t so 
oppressive after all.  
In response, first recall that the source of oppression, in cases of ontological 
oppression, lies unjustly constraining people’s behavior, thought, or affect on the basis 
of their group membership. Even though trans identities always are veridical due to 
trans-inclusive gender kinds, dominant gender kinds remain oppressive in this sense. 
Because the operating gender kinds marginalize and exclude trans and nonbinary 
persons, their identities are frequently rejected or unintelligible within dominant 
contexts. They fail to carry the social meaning that they do in trans-inclusive contexts, 
because they are grounded in gender kinds that do not operate in dominant contexts. In 
short, trans and nonbinary identities are veridical, but socially distorted, unintelligible, 
or erased.  As a result, trans persons’ unwillingly are understood by others in terms of 70
dominant gender kinds, and the unwanted roles, norms, and expectations that 
accompany them.  
While this view can explain why trans identities are veridical in dominant contexts 
without undermining the injustice of dominant gender kinds, two apparent costs 
remain. First, it is possible that there are gender identities that do not correspond to any 
gender kinds. Modest ontological pluralism, on which gender kinds are social and not 
merely psychological phenomena, cannot provide an ontological basis for these 
identities. However, even nonveridical identities can be important in effecting change to 
bring about new gender kinds. Identifying as having a gender that does not yet exist, 
even when these claims are false and largely unintelligible, can be a way to advocate for 
the construction of new gender kinds. (I suspect that, historically, trans and nonbinary 
identities have had this effect. More on this in 4.2.) 
67 Glasgow (2007) argues the same with respect to race. Someone who is ​New-Orleans-Black ​, “when asked, 
can answer truthfully when she says ‘No, I would still be [black] if I went to Brazil.’” 
68 This position is compatible with a mainstream externalist semantics about gender terms like ‘man’. This is 
because someone’s linguistic community--here, trans-inclusive communities--uses the term ‘man’ in a way 
that includes this person in its extension. The meanings of gender terms ‘ain’t just in the head’, but they are 
portable. 
69 Thanks to Lori Watson for raising this worry. 
70 Of course, pejorative social meanings imposed upon trans and nonbinary identities are salient (and 
devastating). 
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Second, modest ontological pluralism implies that those whose gender terms track 
trans-exclusive gender kinds speak truly when they say, e.g., “Trans man are not men,” 
or otherwise refuse to classify trans men as men. This is because, even while a trans man 
belongs to the trans-inclusive kind ​man​, he does not fall within the trans-exclusive kind 
man​. And this latter kind is the one typically picked out by ‘men’ when those in 
dominant contexts say, e.g., “Trans men are not men.”  
Admitting that trans-exclusive classifications can be true might seem like a 
significant cost of modest ontological pluralism. But I actually think it is a virtue. 
Historical examples abound of assertions that were true because of pernicious social 
kinds. In the 19th century, speakers in the United States could truly claim, “Women 
cannot vote,” or “This slave is my property.” Hindsight tells us not that these claims 
were false​, ​but that they were wrong​. ​Similarly, when we take the possibility of 
gender-related ontological oppression seriously, we should expect that there are many 
true gender classifications that are true because of oppressive gender kinds. Or, to 
approach this point from a slightly different angle, even if speakers in trans-exclusive 
contexts get an individual’s gender metaphysically correct (relative to the operative 
kinds)​, ​they still get​ ​gender writ large normatively wrong. To return full circle, this is 
why the Real Gender assumption fails: tracking operative gender kinds is cheap, and 
can reinforce oppression. The interesting and important project, to my mind, is not 
asking whether a gender classification is true. Rather, it is determining what gender 
kinds operate in a social context, and evaluating their relationship to social power and 
privilege -- a topic I’ll return to in section 4.3. 
 
4.2 What about Belief? 
 
Admitting that trans-exclusive gender classifications can be true raises a further worry: 
what about belief? In particular, one might worry that, in rejecting the Real Gender 
assumption, I am advising those in dominant contexts to treat trans-inclusive 
classifications as true but believe that they are false. That is, it seems I am advising those 
in dominant contexts to treat trans men as if they did in fact belong to the dominant 
gender kind ​men​, even though I’ve also argued that they are, at most, marginal members 
of this kind. Such classifications seem akin to ‘noble lies’. At worst, to endorse these 
noble lies seems to undercut or infantilize trans identities. At best, it endorses cognitive 
incoherence, advocating both assertion and disbelief of trans-inclusive gender 
classifications.  Perhaps we should prefer a theory on which everyone, regardless of the 71
operative kinds, should believe​ ​that (and not only act as if) trans-inclusive classifications 
are true.   72
Happily, there are at least two ways to avoid the ‘noble lie’ worry, one more 
controversial than the other. I will discuss both in turn. The first, less controversial 
solution, preserves a standard truth-norm on belief. On this solution, those in dominant 
contexts should believe both that trans men are not men relative to the trans-exclusive 
kind and that trans men are men relative to trans-inclusive kind. However, they should 
classify persons on the basis of the trans-inclusive kind. On the second, more 
71 One might here think of claims like, “It is raining, but I do not believe it is raining.” Shah and Velleman 
(2005), 497, for example, argue that claims like this are incoherent because “the deliberative question 
whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p.” 
72 Thanks to Zoe Johnson King and Elizabeth Barnes for raising this worry. 
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controversial solution, we move to a broader notion of the norms governing belief, such 
that that those in dominant contexts should believe that trans men are men even relative 
to the trans-exclusive kind. 
 
4.2.1 Maintaining a Truth-Norm on Belief 
 
The first solution is, on its face, fairly straightforward. Recall my earlier argument for 
modest ontological pluralism, and the idea that someone has multiple gender kind 
memberships, even when many of those kind are not operative in the immediate 
contexts. Given this, we can distinguish between two propositions that someone within 
a dominant context might pick out when they assert, “Chris (a trans man) is a man”:  73
 
(a) <Chris is a man​dominant-kind​> 
 
(b) <Chris is a man​trans-inclusive-kind​> 
 
So long as this person can refer to a trans-inclusive kind even while in a dominant 
context, their assertion can pick out (b). In that case, even assuming a truth norm on 
belief, those within a dominant context should believe that the assertion “Chris is a 
man” is true. After all, proposition (b) is true.  
This might seem like a sleight of hand. Yes, proposition (b) is true, but so is the 
negation of (a). One might worry I’ve pushed the problem a step back. Perhaps those in 
dominant contexts should believe (b), but assuming a truth norm on belief, they also 
should believe the negation of (a). That is, they should believe that the assertion “Chris 
is a man” is true when it picks out (b); but they also should believe that the assertion 
“Chris is not a man” is true when it picks out the negation of (a).  
Supposing this is the case -- and I lean toward thinking it is -- then the more pressing 
question becomes one of action. Which belief should guide classification practices? That 
is, since those in dominant contexts should believe both (b) and the negation of (a), how 
should they classify Chris’s gender? Which assertion should they make? How shoudl 
they treat Chris? If they classify Chris according to their belief that Chris is not a 
man​dominant-kind​, they do precisely what I’ve argued should be avoided -- they reinforce an 
oppressive gender kind. And yet, if they classify Chris according to their belief that 
Chris is a man​trans-inclusive-kind​, it seems they are doomed to fall into verbal disputes or 
crosstalk with those around them, who use terms like ‘man’ to refer to the operative 
kind, man​dominant-kind​. In other words, we might worry that someone in a dominant 
context will ‘talk past’ others if they classify Chris according to trans-inclusive kinds, 
given that others in their context use the word ‘man’ to pick out man​dominant-kind​.  
Thankfully, the dichotomy between reinforcing ontological oppression and mere 
‘talking past’ is a false one. To see why, we must first recognize that gender 
classifications are not simply descriptive: they have further consequences,  such as 74
applying or enabling gendered constraints, expectations, obligations, and permissions. 
Moreover, many of these social consequences accompanying gender classifications 
remain constant across contexts. For example, when someone asserts ‘Chris is a man’, 
73 While gender classifications happen in many ways, verbal classification is the clearest for discussing the 
issue of belief. 
74 In the case of speech acts of classification, these would be the ‘perlocutionary’ effects of classification. 
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their use of the term ‘man’ conveys a rich body of cultural, emotional, and political 
associations -- associations that are salient even when they use ‘man’ in a way that 
diverges from standard use in the context of utterance. David Plunkett describes such 
terms as ones where the “associations will often be harder to shake than the specific 
application-conditions associated with the term itself, or the specific meaning it has at a 
given time.”  That is, words like ‘woman’ and ‘man’, like ‘freedom’ or ‘person’, have 75
robust associations that--to some extent--remain constant across different referents.  
Recognizing this feature of gender classifications reveals two reasons why someone 
who classifies Chris as a man, even within a dominant context, is not doomed to 
meaningless ‘talking past’. First, when people use terms like ‘man’ differently, they often 
engage in substantive disagreement about who ought to have the robust associations 
welded to that particular gender classification.  Even if two people use the same word 76
(‘man’) to pick out different gender kinds, and respectively claim that Chris is a 
man​trans-inclusive-kind ​and is not a man​dominant-kind​, their dispute is not merely verbal. They 
disagree about whether Chris -- and people like Chris -- should be conferred the social 
associations that come with being classified as a man in the immediate context.  
Second, when someone in a dominant context eschews the operative gender kinds, 
and instead classifies gender according to trans-inclusive kinds, they implicitly provide 
an internal critique of the ideology that sustains dominant gender kinds. More 
specifically, they imply that dominant gender kinds -- despite a pervasive myth of their 
universality and immutability -- are contingent and malleable. They could have been or 
could become otherwise.  
For both of these reasons, disagreements about who (if anyone) ought to be classified 
as a man, woman, or nonbinary (among others), and which kinds (if any) gender terms 
should refer to, are neither trivial nor merely verbal. These disputes are substantive and 
normative; they impact classification practices, and with them, the operative gender 
kinds. 
 
4.2.2 Alternatives to a Truth-Norm on Belief 
 
The second, and more controversial solution targets those who are committed to the idea 
that those in dominant contexts ought to believe that a trans man is a man full stop, even 
relative to the operative gender kinds. The view I’ve described implies that it is at least 
possible and in fact likely that dominant gender kinds marginalize or exclude trans and 
nonbinary identities. If this is right, the combination of these views means that those in 
dominant contexts not only ought to make trans-inclusive classifications, but also ought 
to believe these classifications even when they are unsupported by available evidence. 
While controversial, this view is not without merit.  In recent work, epistemologists 77
have argued that non-truth-tracking reasons bear on whether to believe a proposition. 
For example, Rima Basu argues that “people wrong others in virtue of what they believe 
about them, and not just in virtue of what they do.”  According to Basu, morality 78
75 Plunkett (2015), 843. 
76 Plunkett (2015) calls this a ‘metalinguistic negotiation’, and describes it as a dispute over what concept 
should be employed by a term. Because I think the concepts are important only because of the kinds they 
pick out, I frame this point in terms of the kind referents, rather than concepts. 
77 Thanks to Dan Greco for helpful discussion. 
78 Basu (forthcoming). 
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sometimes gives us a duty to believe against our evidence, especially in cases where we 
have reason to suspect our cognitive frameworks are influenced by prejudice. If Basu is 
correct, and epistemic and moral norms are sometimes inseparable in this way, then 
similarly we might suspect that one ought to believe trans-inclusive gender 
classifications are true, even if we have evidence that they are false. It might be wrong, 
in other words, to believe that trans-inclusive classifications are false, as well as to act as 
if they were false.  
In a similar vein, but emphasizing rationality rather than morality, Rinard (2017) 
argues that the rationality of belief is no different than the rationality of other states. Just 
as non-evidential considerations (e.g., of prudence or morality) can provide reasons to 
take an action, or adopt an intension, Rinard argues that they also can provide reasons to 
adopt a belief (e.g., as in Pascalian cases). If Rinard is right, then the fact that it would be 
politically and morally best to believe trans-inclusive gender classifications is just as 
much a reason to adopt those beliefs as the fact that they are supported by one's 
evidence. It might be rational to believe that trans-inclusive classifications are true, even 
if one has evidence that they are false. 
Finally, and somewhat along Rinard’s lines, one might think that even if rational 
belief concerns epistemic rationality specifically, this rationality must be more holistic 
than merely tracking evidential support for a specific classification.  If accurately 79
tracking (and thus maintaining) trans-exclusive gender kinds means that trans persons 
and their experiences are not intelligible, and knowledge about them is precluded, then 
these practices are epistemically failing in a larger sense. Why should rationality concern 
tracking evidential support for a given claim, but not gaining fuller understanding of 
social phenomena and other persons?  Here again, believing trans-inclusive gender 80
classifications are true may be rational even in the face of contrary evidence, because it 
moves toward filling a large hermeneutical gap.  81
 
4.3 Methodological Upshots  
 
In closing, I want to flag methodological upshots of my view. As noted earlier, although 
gender kinds are widely taken to be socially constructed, many metaphysicians frame 
gender kinds as operative across all contexts, or at least fail to specify which gender 
kinds are under consideration. One result is a tendency to model trans inclusive gender 
kinds as though they operated in dominant contexts. The motivation for doing so is 
admirable, but this tendency risks overlooking ontological oppression. If we aim to 
analyze the kinds operating in dominant contexts, we should be prepared to find unjust 
79 Here I draw from Quine’s (1951) picture of a web of belief, in which experience underdetermines our 
conceptual systems, but in which these systems can be modified in better or worse ways to reduce conflict 
with experience.   
80 Jose Medina (2012) argues that this kind of ignorance among privileged persons with respect to oppressed 
groups protects their privilege by masking insensitivities and prejudices. 
81 Here, someone might have the same worry as in 4.2.1: What good can it do to make false classifications, 
even when based on rational (or moral) beliefs? My response is the same. False gender classifications are 
part of substantive, normative disputes over what gender classification practices ​ought ​to be, even if they are 
descriptively incorrect about what these practices already are. 
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gender kinds – kinds that are illegitimate on a variety of grounds, but nevertheless 
obtain.  82
Historically, revealing oppressive gender kinds has been the task of feminist 
metaphysics.  The rising influence of trans-inclusive communities has brought to 83
philosophy a new impulse: theorize trans-inclusive gender kinds. This impulse is a good 
one. However, this theorizing is often presented in one of two ways. The first is to 
describe trans-inclusive gender kinds as though they are the ​only ​gender kinds, 
operating even within dominant contexts.  The second is to describe trans-inclusive 84
concepts or semantics, and to contrast these with ‘material’ gender kinds, which are 
taken to be binary and heterosexist.  Either use of an otherwise helpful impulse is, I 85
think, dangerous on at least two counts. 
First, these approaches risk getting gender phenomena wrong and, in so doing, 
entrenching an unproductive ideological divide. While the first ignores 
trans-exclusionary gender kinds altogether, the second ignores the extent to which 
gendered material realities and gender concepts and semantics are mutually reinforcing. 
Trans-exclusive concepts uphold and are upheld by trans-exclusive structures and 
practices. As a result, either approach suggests that those in dominant contexts are 
radically ignorant about their operative gender kinds. More particularly, they at least 
appear to say that the gender concepts and semantics many people have used 
throughout their lives are as illegitimate as ​phlogiston ​or ​unicorns. ​Unsurprisingly, the 
backlash to this (at least perceived) suggestion writes off gender theories as products of 
ivory tower elitism. 
Second, these theoretical approaches camouflage, rather than illuminate, the 
structures and practices that threaten trans and gender nonconforming bodies every 
day. Materialist feminist history emphasizes how sex, sexuality, and gender are 
constrained and even defined by heteropatriarchal institutions. And while feminist 
metaphysics should not solely focus on these institutions, it also should not ignore them, 
instead describing gender kinds that presumably would operate in (more) just contexts.  
Metaphysics is big enough for all of us. Certainly, it is big enough for theories of the 
gender kinds that operate in dominant as well as trans-friendly contexts, not to mention 
many other contexts. But one should not expect to find ideal gender kinds. Even in 
trans-friendly spaces, inflections of race, ability, class, and sexuality construct gender 
kinds that marginalize or fail to recognize certain groups. A central task of feminist 
philosophy is, I take it, to model gender kinds while illuminating their relationships to 
power and privilege, rather than to theorize about presumptively ideal gender kinds.   86
82 Their illegitimacy, in my view, stems from not only their injustice, but also their basis in an gender 
ideology ridden with false beliefs about the ‘naturalness’ of binary gender kinds, not to mention an assumed 
‘natural’ relationship between natal genitalia and persons’ psychologies, personalities, and social roles. 
83 Simone de Beauvoir, Monique Wittig, Judith Butler, Catharine MacKinnon, Sally Haslanger, and others 
described dominant gender kinds in material terms: hierarchical, binary, oppressive, heterosexist, 
self-reinforcing, and caught up in economic, racist, and other oppressive systems. 
84 See, e.g., McKitrick (2015),  
85 See, e.g., Jenkins (2015). 
86 In this respect, I take my methodology to align with Sally Haslanger’s (2000) notion of the ‘ameliorative 
project’. For Haslanger, an ameliorative project in feminist metaphysics requires that one look at the world 
to see how a given social kind functions - i.e., what social work it does - and then model this kind in a way 
that is conducive for social justice projects. In the case of oppressive social kinds, for example, ameliorative 
projects would reveal the oppressive natures of these kinds. While I agree with Haslanger, I additionally 
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With this mindset, I trust it will become even clearer why we must reject the Real 
Gender assumption. This assumption does not challenge, but reinforces existent power. I 
propose a pluralistic turn to empirically informed theorizing about the many gender 
kinds that operate across various contexts. The Real Gender assumption should not 
settle the future of gender kinds, dominant or otherwise. But this doesn’t mean we have 
nowhere to look.  87
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